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the United States Supreme Court would have arrived at a
similar conclusion if it had had this particular problem before it in the Urie case.
In view of my conclusion that it should be held that the
statute of limitations did not commence to run until the
manifestation of substantial harm in 1953, it is unnecessary
to consider whether, in any event, defendant employer should
be held to have waived the running of the statute of limitations
for the period during which plaintiff continued to work at
the same employment with defendant's consent and continued
to receive treatment from defendant's medical facilities for
an affliction which appeared to be of a relatively minor and
temporary nature.
For the reasons stated, I concur in the reversal of the
judgment.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent, for the reasons expressed by Mr.
Justice Warne in the opinion prepared by him for the District
Court of Appeal, (Cal.App.) 311 P.2d 40.
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GRACE MARIE VATER, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF
GJ_.~I~NN et al., Defendants; GLENN-COLUSA IRlUGATION DISTRICT, Respondent.
[1] State of California-Tort Liability.-Generally, in the absence
of a statutory or constitutional provision to the contrary, the
state and its agencies are immune from liability for tort in the
discharge of governmental duties and activities.
[2] Waters-Irrigation Districts-Liability in Tort.-The general
rule of immunity of the state and its agencies from liability for
tort in the discharge of governmental duties and activities is
applicable to irrigation districts.
[3] Id. -Irrigation Districts- Liability in Tort.- Wat. Code,
§§ 22730, 22731, relating to public liability of irrigation districts, show a legislative intent not to abrogate the rule of
governmental immunity from tort liability for irrigation dis[1] See Cal.Jur., State of California, § 37 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
States, Territories and Dependencies, §§ 73, 75 et seq.
[2] See Cal.Jur., Waters, § 644; Am.Jur,. Irrigation, § 85.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4, 5] State of California,§ 57; [2, 3]
Waters, § 549; [ 6] Nuisances, § 49; Waters, § 549.
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[4]
loss caused
tortious conduct of the government rest on the
injured individual
it among all members of the
matter, and
where the
its intention to
maintain
that intention is uv<tH<JlHll!L.
[5] !d.-Tort Liability.-To state a cause of action based on the
theory that an
to the doctrine of immunity from
liability for tort
where a
unit is maintaining a nuisance,
must show that a legislative body
has declared the
of to be a nuisance.
[6] Nuisances-Pleading: Waters-Irrigation Districts-Liability
in Tort.-A
in a
death action alleging that
certain persons, some of whom were agents of defendant
irrigation district, constructed a private roadway over their
land in extension of a county road so as to make the private
roadway appear to be
of the county road, that the district or its predecessor in interest constructed a wooden
bridge to connect two portions of the private roadway which
were separated by the district's main canal, that there was a
45-degree turn where the roadway met the bridge but the
turn was not indicated by any signs or warning devices, that
the levees of the canal were above the roadway and travelers
could not observe the abrupt change of direction or see the
bridge until they were upon it, and that the roadway and
bridge (which was later taken over by defendant county) thus
constituted a dangerous and defective condition and an "absolute nuisance per se," did not state facts sufficient to constitute
a nuisance; the situation therein described was not injurious
to health within the meaning of Civ. Code, § 3479, there was
no specific allegation that the accident, which occurred when
plaintiff's husband drove his car off the bridge into the canal,
took place on a public highway, and the claimed defective
condition did not unlawfully obstruct the free use of the road,
even if viewed as a public one.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Glenn
County and from an order denying motion to vacate the judgment. W. T. Belieu and Curtiss E. Wetter,• Judges. Affirmed.
Action for damages for wrongful death.
defendants affirmed.
*Assigned b7 Chairman of Judicial ConneD.
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Duard F.
Byrd,

Geis & Byrd and Carroll F.

C. J.-Plaintiff
this action
Glenn
County and the Glenn-Colusa
District
damages
for the
death of her
and son. General
and special demurrers by the district to the second amended
complaint were sustained without leave to amend, and judgment was entered in its favor. 1 Plaintiff moved to set aside
the judgment upon the grounds of mistake, inadvertence,
surprise and excusable neglect. She filed a supporting affidavit of her attorney to the effect that on the hearing of the
demurrer he had neglected to argue an available theory of
liability. The motion was denied without prejudice to its
renewal within 10 days, accompanied by a proposed amended
complaint. Pursuant to this permission plaintiff renewed the
motion and presented a proposed third amended complaint.
This motion was also denied.
The principal question is whether plaintiff has alleged facts
which constitute a cause of action.
The allegations of the second amended complaint may be
summarized as follows: In 1910 certain persons, some of
whom were agents of the district, constructed a private roadway over their land in extension of County Road R so as to
make the private
appear to be part of the county
road. About the same time the district or its predecessor in
interest constructed a wooden bridge to connect two portions
of the private roadway which were separated by the district's
main canal. There was a 45-degree turn where the roadway
met the bridge, but the turn was not indicated by any signs
or warning devices, and there were no adequate barricades,
railings or lights. The levees of the canal were above the roadway, and, because of the construction and height of the levees
and the bridge, travelers could not observe the abrupt change
of direction or see the bridge until they were upon it. As a
result, travelers were likely to drive off the bridge into the
canal, and the roadway and bridge thus constituted a dangerous and defective condition and an ''absolute nuisance
per se." The district
this condition to exist on
"The county of Glenn apparently :filed an answer to plaintiff's second
amended complaint.

PrElmises without
a reasonable
over by the
to be ma:Int;anled
Although the
and its ,,,,.,.,";"'"''"'
failed to """"""rliv
husband was led
the am:JPa.ra!'lP.e
rn•'r~"'"" to believe that it
mate result of the da11gerou
the
he drove his car
he and his son were killed.
The
third amended
in sub"'"'"'"""'" of the second amended complaint and
further stated that there is a
between the several
parties as to whether the
or the district or both are
responsible for the maintenance
the bridge and that plaintiff does not know whether either or both are responsible. It
was also alleged that
does not know whether the district constructed the bridge or acquired it, that the dangerous
condition has existed for 40 years and that the district had
notice of it.
[1] The general rule is
in the absence of a statutory
or constitutional provision to
contrary, the state and its
agencies are immune from
for tort in the discharge
of governmental duties and activities. (Pianka v. State,
46 Cal.2d 208, 210
P.2d 458]; Talley v. Northern San
Diego County
41 Cal.2d 33, 36 [257 P.2d 22];
Stang v. City of Mill
38 Cal.2d 486, 488 [240 P.2d
980].) [2] This rule has been applied to irrigation districts.
(Nissen v. Cordua Irr. Dist., 204 Cal. 542, 545 [269 P. 171];
Jackson & Perkins Co. v. Byron-Bethany Irr. Dist., 136 Cal.
App. 375, 380 et seq. [29 P.2d 217, 30 P.2d 516]; Whiteman
v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irr. Dist., 60 Cal.App. 234, 241-242
[212 P. 706]; see Talley v. Northern San Diego County Hospital Dist., 41 Cal.2d 33, 40 [257 P.2d 22].)
Plaintiff does not claim that the district was acting in a
proprietary capacity with respect to the bridge and roadway,
and the only provisions upon which she relies as constituting
a waiver of the district's immunity are sections 22725-22732
of the Water
which constitute the article entitled "Public !Jiability" in the division of the code relating to irrigation
districts.
div.
5, ch. 4, art. 4.) These
sections are of no avail to
[3] Section 22731 reads :
in the preceding portion of this article shall be construed as creating any liability
except as provided in Section 22730 unless it would have
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Irr.
considered the "~'v"c"'u
tion district
law
pealed when the Water
3 [now section
trict by
officers.
the only new
Cal.2d at p.
127.) The Powers Farms case was an action for damage to
land caused
the seepage of water from a canal of an irrigation district, and it was
under the
of article
I, section
of the California Constitution which prohibits
use without
compensation.
damage to property for
We held that this provision gave the
a cause of action
against the district, but that the part of section 23 of the
irrigation district liability law which
the
of a
claim in actions based upon the
or defective conto the action,
dition of property of the district was
and that plaintiff's failure to file a claim prevented his recovery. It is clear that we did not consider section 2 of the act as
imposing liability upon the district for defective conditions
because we expressly stated that the basis of liability was the
constitutional provision (19 CaL2d at p. 126) and that the
act imposed no liability on the district other than the one to
pay certain judgments
its officers (19 Cal.2d at
p. 127, quoted above).
•section 22732, the only section in the article which follows section
2273], permits the district to
any liability. It is not alleged
the
carried insurance covering the liability claimed here, in which case it has sometimes been held
that the :injured person could maintain an action. (Taylor v. Knox
Cmmty Board of Education, 292 Ky. 767 [167 S.W.2d 700); Rogers v.
Butler, 170 Tenn. 125 [92 S.W.2d 414].)
"Now contained in section 22727 of the code which provides: "Whenever it is claimed that any person or
has been
or damaged as a result of any
or
condition
any property
under the control of any
or lts officers or employees or the
negligence of any officer or
of a district, a verified claim for
damages shall be presented in
and filed with the officers or employees involved and also with
within 90 days after the
accident or injury has occurred. If an
or employee cannot be
found to be served, the o:fi1cer's or employee's copy may be served
on the secretary, but in any event a verified claim must be served on
the secretary. "
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There is no doubt that section 4 of the act and section
22731 of the code show a
intent not to abrogate
the rule of
for
districts
except with respect to the
of such judgments. In
the present case no
has been obtained or sought
against any officer of
liability cannot be based upon the
of the Water Code.
[4] Most of the authorities who have
written
on the subject strongly advocate abolition or modification of
the principle of
which lets the loss
caused by tortious conduct of the government rest on the injured individual instead of
it among all the
members of the
the beneficiaries of the governmental activity. (See, e. g., 2 Harper and James, The Law
of Torts (1956), 1612; Prosser on Torts (2d ed. 1955), 775;
Borchard, State and jjfunicipal Liability in Tort-Proposed
Statutory Reform, 20 .A.B..A.J. 747 et seq.; Kuchel, Should
California Accept Tort Liability? 25 Cal. State Bar J. 146,
151.) However, the
or restriction of this doctrine is primarily a
matter (see Talley v. Northern San Diego County Hospital
41 Cal.2d 33, 41 [257
P.2d 22]; Waterman v. Los Angeles County General Hospital, 123 Cal..App.2d 143, 144 [266 P.2d 221]), and, where,
as here, the Legislature has clearly expressed its intention to
maintain immunity, that intention is controlling.
[5] Several cases have recognized an exception to the immunity doctrine where a governmental unit is maintaining a
nuisance. (Phillips v. City of Pasadena, 27 Cal.2d 104, 106107 [162 P.2d 625] ; Hassell v. City & Omtnty of San Francisco, 11 Cal.2d 168, 170 [78 P.2d 1021]; Adams v. City of
Modesto, 131' Cal. 501, 502-503 [63 P. 1083] ; Peterson v. City
of Santa Rosa, 119 Cal. 387 [51 P. 557] ; Lind v. City of San
Luis Obispo, 109 Cal. 340, 343 [42 P. 437] ; Bloom v. City &
County of San Francisco, 64 Cal. 503 [3 P. 129] .) In considering whether the facts alleged are sufficient to constitute a
nuisance, we must keep in mind that, in order to state a cause
of action based upon this theory, the
must show that
a legislative body has declared the condition complained of
to be a nuisance. (Palmquist v. Met·cer, 43 Cal.2d 92, 101
[272 P.2d 26]; Ward v. Oakley Go., 125 Cal..App.2d 840, 850851 [271 P.2d 536] ; Brooks v. O#y of Monterey, 106 Cal..App.
649, '654 [290 P. 540] ; cf. People v. Lim, 18 Cal.2d 872, 879
et seq. [118 P.2d 472]; People v. Johnson, 129 Cal.App.2d
1, 8-9 [277 P.2d 45] .)
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(6] Plaintiff contends that this case comes within section
in part: "Anything
which is
. or unlawfully obstructs the
manner, of . . . any
a nuisance." The situation
was not
to health within
u>ca.u"'""E; of this section. There is no
allegation
that the accident took
on a
highway, and, even
if we were to assume that this deficiency is cured by the
allegations that the
was a
bridge and that
plaintiff's husband believed the road to be a public highway,
the claimed defective condition did not unlawfully obstruct
the free use of the road in the customary manner. Our attention has been called to no other statute which would support
a conclusion that the facts
constitute a nuisance.
Plaintiff claims that the trial court failed to recognize the
nuisance exception to the
doctrine and that she
should be given another opportunity to amend her complaint.
She has made no contention, however, that her allegations
which describe the condition of the bridge and roadway are
untrue or incomplete, and it does not appear that there is
any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by
amendment. Under the circumstances, there was no abuse of
discretion in failing to grant further leave to amend. (Of.
Lemoge E~ectric v. County of San Mateo, 46 Cal.2d 659, 664
[297 P.2d 638].)
The order sustaining the demurrer to the second amended
complaint is not appealable, and the attempted appeal therefrom is dismissed. The judgment and the order denying the
motion to vacate the
are affirmed.

3479 of the Civil

Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
Once again this court is faced with the question of the
scope of
and again the majority has
seen fit to broaden the scope when an analysis of applicable
statutes shows such action to be clearly unwarranted.
The majority in this case determines that the irrigation
district
the
is immune from suit under
the doctrine of
immunity on the grounds that
there is no statutory basis for liability, and that the condition
complained of was not a nuisance within the meaning of Civil

C.2d

Code (
the case r.nrl<:!h•n
ed Irr.
Section 22727

is not without authere is no basis for
incorrect and the result
article of the Water
section 22727 and
Inc. v. Oonsolidat.)

that '' \Vhenever
has been injured
uain<logeu as a result of
or defective condition
nl'."n'""tv under the control of any district or its officers
or
or the
of any officer or employee of
a
a verified claim for
shall be presented in
writing and filed with the officers or employees involved and
also with the
of the district within 90
after the
has occurred. If an officer or employee
accident or
cannot be found to be
the officer's or employee's copy
but in any event a verified
may be served on the
" (Emphasis added.)
claim must be served on the
The progenitor of this section is found in Deering General
p.
and was entitled the Irrigation
Laws (Stats.
District
Law. With the exception of the words
''and/ or'' which were inserted as follows : '' \Vher ,·er . . .
as a result of any . . . condition of any property under the
control of any district or its officers or employ'2es and/or the
~'"''""''"''LL'-''-' of any officer . . . " the two sections are identical.
To be more
the Public
article has merely incorporated the sections of the
District Liability
these sections different designations: sections
Law and
1 and 2 of the
Law became sections 22725, 22726,
and 22732 of the Water
section 2 was further transposed into sections 22727 and 22729, and sections 3 and 4
became sections 22730 and 22731.
The
District
Law was construed in
Powers
Inc. v. OonsoUdated Irr. Dist., 19 Cal.2d 123
[119 P.2d 717]. In that case
brought an action
lT'vw·~.t"''n district for
sustained as a result
The action was based upon
of the California Constitution requiring
for
or taken for a
the principle that failure
of section 2
§ 22727) was fatal to a
nl"nn.Pl"t.v

Mar.
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re<{UJtreme:nt:s, could maintain an action based
upon the constitutional
This court held that he
could not. The court reasoned that the act evinced a
intent to embrace all actions
Inc. v. Consolidated Irr.
supra, 129 ,
and that failure to
with the
ed a cause of action
In
its conclusion the court
sections
of the Irrigation
Law at
there any indication to forsake the
enabled injured parties to sue the
its
officers or employees. To the ""'nt.>'5l1'v
to point out that section 2
against a district on
of " ( 1) a
condition of property of the district and
officer Or employee or (2) a dangerous Or £11'1·1'~11'1
of property of the district, that
a general
reference to negligence, or (3) the
employee." (Emphasis added.) (Powers
Inc. v. Consolidated hr. Dist., supra, 128.) This statement is
only of the interpretation that an
district's governmental immunity is removed by this statute and that such
districts are liable
of their
or officers.
Therefore, it vcrould seem to follow that
section 2 of
the Irrigation
Law and
22727 of the Water
Code are the same, and under the former a district is liable
apart from its
for a
and defective condition, the district still remains liable
under section
22727.
However, we are now told that this is not so, but that by
some peculiar alchemy the
of the Irrigation
District Liability Law into the
Code altered the nature
of these sections to such an
that this court is now required to regard sections 22730
22731 of the Water Code
as controlling. Thus, the district's
would be limited
to negligent acts of its officers in their official capacity. Furthermore we are told that in the Powers case "It is clear that
we did not consider section 2 of the act [now Wat. Code,
§ 22727] as imposing
upon the district for defective
conditions because we
stated that the basis of liability was the constitutional provision [citation] and that the
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aet imposed no
district other than the one
to pay certain
its officers [citation]."
As an original
the majority's construction of
sections 22730 and 22731
have been plausible, but it is
now forestalled by the Powers case. Moreover, if this court
now seeks to
the Powers case as not affecting the
district's liability other than as described in sections 22730
and 22731, it will be necessary to
the contrary language therein since a
of that case makes it obvious
such was not the interpretation when it was written.
To substantiate this latter statement one need only read
this court's restatement of plaintiff's contention in the Powers
case, which appears as follows: "The respondent .•. contends that the law [Irrigation District Liability LawJ concerns actions sounding in tort; that it has no reference to the
general liability of the district, and should be construed as
applying only to suits against directors, officers, agents, and
employees, based on negligence, and to the secondary liability of the district, created by section 3 [now Wat. Code,
§ 22730], to pay certain judgments against officers." (Emphasis added; 19 Cal.2d 123, 127-128.) This contention was
rejected notwithstanding sections identical to sections 22730
and 22731 of the Water Code. This court stated that the
statute could only be construed in the manner contended
by ignoring the reference in the title to the liability of the
irrigation district and the phraseology of section 2 (now
Wat. Code, § 22727). There can be no question from this
language that this court, at the time of the Powers case,
viewed the district as liable apart from its officers.
The Powers case, then, established that the district's liability was twofold: (1) a general indepE'lHlent liability under
section 2 of the liability law (now Wat. Code, § 22727) and
(2) liability for the negligent act of its employees in their
official capacity. The necessary implication of the decision
being that sections 3 and 4 of the liability law (now Wat.
Code, §§ 22730 and 22731) were only describing the conditions
under which a district would be liable for the acts of its employees and were not
the district's independent liability. Thus, without sections 3 and 4 a district would not be
liable for the acts of its employees when discharging governmental duties and activities since a statutory provision is
necessary to remove the protection of governmental immunity
(see Nissen v. Cordua Irr. Dist., 204 Cal. 542, 545 [269 P.
171]; Jackson & Perkins Co. v. Byron-Bethany Irr. Dist.,
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136 Cal.App. 375, 380 [29 P.2d 217, 30 P.2d 516]). Under
sections 3 and 4 a district's liability for its employees follows
only when a judgment is rendered against an employee who,
acting in his official capacity, negligently injures another,
and providing proper notice is given to the district (Wat.
Code, §§ 22727, 22730, 22731). However, if this is the extent
of the district's liability it is obvious there is a large gap
between the persons who may recover· against a district and
those who are injured. The closing of this gap was achieved
in the Powers case where this court construed the applicable
sections as rendering the district liable under specified conditions apart from its employees. The court did not blur
their intent but made it manifest that sections 3 and 4 were
not to be regarded as trespassing on an injured person's right
to proceed directly against the district apart from its employees. (Powers Farms, Inc. v. Consolidated Irr. Dist.,
1upra, 128.)
Therefore, section 22727 affirmatively answers the majority's question of whether there is a statute declaring the district liable independently of its employees. Any doubt that
this is its purpose or meaning is answered in Powers Farms,
Inc. v. Consolidated Irr. Dist., supra. If there is some question concerning the legislative intent as to this section, the
members of the court may draw comfort from the fact that
the Legislature has apparently acquiesed to the Powers case
and its implications since they were well aware of it but
made no changes when codifying the Water Code.
Where plaintiff's complaint alleges compliance with the
procedural prerequisites, as here, and sets forth proper
grounds for a claim against the district, that is, a dangerous
and defective condition is being maintained which caused an
injury, this is all that is necessary to state a cause of action
(see Knight v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal.2d 764, 766 [160
P.2d 779]; Insolo v. Imperialirr. Dist., 147 CaLApp.2d 172,
175 [305 P.2d 176]).
For the foregoing reasons the trial court erroneously sustained defendant's general demurrer, and the judgment of
dismissal which followed should be reversed.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied April 16,
1958. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.

